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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates how redistributive policies affect intergenerational earnings mobility 
and lifetime earnings inequality. Numerous public policies are aimed at promoting “equality of 
opportunity” in the sense of improving the earnings opportunities for children of the poor. 
Examples include public education finance, tax exemptions on savings earmarked for 
educational purposes, and subsidized student loans. Promoting intergenerational mobility is 
also a secondary objective of redistributive tax-transfer policies, whose primary objective is to 
reduce earnings inequality. This paper investigates to what extent such policies accomplish 
their objectives. Specifically, the paper seeks to answer two questions: (i) Do policies that raise 
the returns to human capital accumulation promote intergenerational earnings mobility? (ii) Do 
such policies reduce lifetime earnings inequality? 
Answering these questions requires a quantitative theory of intergenerational earnings mobility 
and lifetime earnings inequality that is consistent with key features of the data. Since little is 
known about how intergenerational mobility varies with parental characteristics, such as 
schooling and ability, the paper constructs a dataset of matched parents and children and 
develops a set of stylized intergenerational mobility facts. It then offers a model that can 
quantitatively account for these stylized facts. The model combines the features of a 
conventional life-cycle model with a theory of the intergenerational transmission of education 
and ability along the lines of Becker and Tomes (1986, hereafter BT). The model is calibrated 
to U.S. data and numerical simulations are used to measure the steady state effects of 
redistributive policies.  
The paper first studies policies that reduce the private costs of education. The particular policy 
experiment examined is a tuition subsidy, but it is intended to capture the effects of other 
policies that distort the same relative price, such as subsidized student loans or tax-exemptions 
of savings earmarked for education. The main finding is that such policies have minimal impact 
on intergenerational earnings mobility. This holds despite the fact that education subsidies can 
have large effects on educational investment. Tuition subsidies also fail to reduce lifetime 
earnings inequality. In fact, some measures of inequality, such as the quintile ratio, actually 
increase with the tuition subsidy. The reason is that low ability agents are induced to invest in 
education, even though this reduces their lifetime earnings. 
The paper next examines whether redistributive tax policies are more successful in promoting 
intergenerational mobility. The specific policy experiment studied is the move from flat rate to 
progressive labor income taxes modeled after the U.S. tax system. This experiment is designed  2 
to capture policies that increase the relative reward of investing in education for lower ability 
agents. The induced changes in intergenerational mobility are again minimal. However, the 
progressive tax reduces lifetime earnings inequality as measured by the quintile ratio by 10%. 
These findings suggest that redistributive tax and subsidy policies of the kind studied here may 
be largely ineffective for promoting “equality of opportunity.” The intuition for this result is as 
follows. Individual earnings are determined by an unmeasured ability endowment and by 
human capital investments. Intergenerational persistence arises as parental ability and human 
capital affect the distribution of child abilities. Public policy can therefore affect 
intergenerational persistence by changing parental education and job training investments. 
However, the policies studied here have little effect on job training for reasons that are well-
known, mainly because job training inputs are paid for by foregone earnings. The policies do 
have a substantial impact on parental education. However, viewing the data through the lens of 
the model reveals that parental education has a limited impact on child abilities, once parental 
abilities are controlled for. Since the distribution of earnings is determined largely by abilities, 
very large changes in parental education choices are required to significantly alter child 
earnings. This logic suggests that policies which affect only education but not other human 
capital investments are not effective tools for changing intergenerational earnings mobility. 
The finding that redistributive policies have little effect on intergenerational mobility thus 
depends on the empirical observation that parental education has a limited impact on child 
ability once parental ability is controlled for. It is important to emphasize that this observation 
is not independent of theory. It requires identifying assumptions provided by the model. An 
important task for future research is therefore to investigate the robustness of the findings 
under alternative models of the transmission of ability and education. 
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the emerging 
literature studying the effects of public policies on intergenerational mobility. Knowles (1999) 
investigates the impact of redistributive tax policies on the welfare of the poor in a model with 
realistic intergenerational mobility properties. In his model intergenerational persistence is due 
to two features that are most relevant for low income parents: fertility choice and borrowing 
constraints. Since these features are abstracted from in the present paper, his work should be 
viewed as complementary to mine. The paper also contributes to the literature studying the 
effects of tax policies on inequality. Most existing studies have abstracted from human capital 
accumulation and find very small changes in earnings inequality (e.g., Castaneda et al. 1998). 
Notable exceptions are Heckman et al. (1998, hereafter HLT) and Knowles (1999). This paper 
extends HLT’s work mainly by allowing for intergenerational transmission of education and 
ability.  3 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the intergenerational 
mobility observations that motivate the model developed in section 3. The choice of model 
parameters is given in section 4, followed by simulation results in section 5. The final section 
concludes. 
2. Intergenerational Mobility Facts 
This section provides estimates of the intergenerational persistence of earnings and education 
for a sample of U.S. workers. A number of stylized facts are documented that provide the basis 
for the model presented in section 3. Only an outline of the empirical approach is presented 
here together with the main findings. Details are provided in the data appendix of Hendricks 
(1999c).  
2.1 Empirical  Approach 
The data are taken from the 1968 to 1992 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID). For an individual to be included, he/she has to satisfy the following criteria: At least 10 
years with positive earnings must be observed at ages between 18 and 70 while the individual 
is “head” or “wife” of the household. Education must be reported in at least one year after the 
age of 30 (to make sure that reported education does not change at some later age). Annual 
work hours must lie between 500 and 4000. The individual must have positive sample weight. 
Estimating intergenerational mobility from observations that combine men and women is 
difficult because it is not clear whether the gender earnings gap reflects differences in human 
capital, the disruption of female work histories during child-rearing, or discrimination. All 
results presented here are therefore obtained from all-male samples.
1 
It is assumed that individual earnings are determined by unmeasured ability, education, age, 
sex, and a transitory idiosyncratic shock. Abilities are divided into q = 1, …, nq classes with 
equal mass in each (Pr(q) = 1 / nq).
2 The choice of nq is determined by two opposing 
considerations. On the one hand, a larger nq yields a more precise description of the earnings 
distribution. On the other hand, it reduces the number of observations in each ability/education 
cell and makes the results harder to understand. The results reported here are therefore based 
                                                 
1 Allowing for daughters in addition to sons changes the findings little. However, mothers are found to 
affect the earnings and education of their offspring much less than fathers. 
2 Throughout the paper, the notation Pr(q, s) is used to denote the joint distribution of q and s. Pr(q) 
denotes the marginal distribution, and Pr(q | s) is the conditional distribution.  4 
on  nq = 4, but increasing nq up to 7 makes little difference. Educational attainment is divided 
into ns = 2 classes, where s = 1 represents up to 15 years of schooling and s = 2 represents 
more than 15 years of schooling. I refer to the each group by the highest degree attained by the 
typical group member (high school graduates and college graduates, respectively). 
The first step characterizes the distribution of lifetime earnings in each education/sex group. 
This is accomplished by estimating earnings regressions of the form 
  i a i i a a a y ,
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separately for each group. Here y denotes annual earnings in 1992 dollars, i indexes the 
individual, a is age, and x is an i.i.d. disturbance.
3 Denote by  i c ˆ  the intercept ci purged of 
cohort effects using a linear regression of the ci on birth years. Each individual is assigned a 
present value of earnings proportional to  i e
c ˆ : 
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a D  is cumulative discount factor based on an interest rate of 3.5%, which is 
close to the one generated by the model below. Note that the age at which earnings begin 
differs by schooling class, but earnings are discounted to a common age of 16 for all 
individuals. This is important for capturing the main cost of attending college, foregone 
earnings.  
The result is a joint distribution of the present values of earnings and schooling in each group. 
An algorithm described in Hendricks (1999c) is then used to assign households to ability 
classes, which allows to estimate the mean present values of earnings in each (q, s) class, Eq,s 
together with the population share of each class Pr(q,s). The algorithm requires the identifying 
assumption is that earnings increase with ability within each schooling class. 
The second step matches parents with their children and constructs intergenerational transition 
probabilities, Pr(q | q
P, s
P) and Pr(s | q, s
P), where the superscript P indicates parental variables. 
For example, the distribution of child abilities conditional on parental abilities and education, 
Pr(q | q
P, s
P) is estimated as the fraction of children of ability q of all children whose parents 
have ability q
P and schooling s
P. Since the characteristics of parents and children are not 
identical, the estimated transition probabilities are not consistent with the model’s requirement 
that the distribution of (q, s) be stationary. The transition probabilities are therefore adjusted 
                                                 
3 In a more general ARMA model, Moffitt and Gottschalk (1993) show that the serial correlation of 
transitory component of earnings is very small.  5 
such that they generate the observed distribution Pr(q, s) as the stationary distribution (see 
Hendricks 1999c for details). 
Clearly, this estimation approach could be extended in various ways. A number of authors 
suggest to use instrumental variables in the estimation of lifetime earnings. Given that the 
sample includes at least 10 years of observations for each individual (and in many cases more 
than 20 years), it seems preferable not to do so. Additional explanatory variables could be 
included in the regression equation. For example, one might attempt to control for the increase 
in the college premium by allowing the return to education to vary over time. Alternative 
approaches for estimating transition matrices could be imagined. Instead of pursuing these 
extensions, I provide a model sensitivity analysis below which suggests that the findings are 
robust to sensible variations in intergenerational persistence measures. 
2.2 Empirical  Findings 
Average lifetime earnings by ability and education (Eq,s), measured in 1992 dollars, are shown 
in table 1. Two important insights emerge. First, variation in ability determines most of the 
variation in earnings. The top quartile earns about 4 times more than the bottom quartile, 
whereas a college education increases earnings by at most 16%. This is consistent with the 
common finding that education and other observable characteristics account for only a fraction 
of lifetime earnings variation (e.g., Fullerton and Rogers 1993). The second finding is that 
obtaining a college degree increases the present value of earnings substantially only for the 
highest q class. This finding appears surprising at first, but is supported by HLT based on 
different data and estimation procedures. Attaining college increases peak earnings for all q, 
but the present value of earnings increases by less than peak earnings because college 
attendance postpones the start of work life by four years. An important implication is that 
lower taxes may lead low ability households to reduce college attendance. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]  
Transition probabilities for schooling are shown in table 2. The main observation is that, even 
controlling for the child’s ability, parental schooling substantially increases the probability that 
the child attains college. This strongly suggests that schooling is transmitted to the child 
independently of ability. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Transition probabilities for abilities, shown in table 3, exhibit considerable persistence. For 
example, for a parent with college degree the probability of having a child in the top ability 
class is 42% for q
P = 4 compared with 19.9% for q
P = 1. However, it is not only the parent’s  6 
ability that determines the child’s ability, parental schooling also has a significant effect. These 
findings motivate how the intergenerational transmission of earnings is modeled below.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
3. The Model 
The model combines a conventional life-cycle model along the lines of HLT with a theory of 
the intergenerational transmission of human capital along the lines of Becker and Tomes 
(1986). There are three types of agents: households, firms, and a government. Only steady 
states are considered. 
3.1 Households 
At each date a cohort of unit measure is born which lives for aL periods. The household is 
inactive until age a0, engages in full-time schooling until age aS, works until age aR and is 
retired thereafter. Each household gives birth to a single child at age aB. 
Households are endowed with an ability parameter  } , , 2 , 1 { q n q ￿ Î  and schooling cost 
parameters for each education level,  } , , 1 { , s s n s p ￿ Î . These represent non-pecuniary costs of 
schooling and are drawn independently across households from a continuous distribution. Each 
household chooses the schooling level, s, and an age profile of job training investments so as to 
maximize the present value of lifetime earnings net of education costs. The household then 
chooses a lifetime profile of consumption subject to a present value budget constraint. 
Household variables are therefore indexed by birth date, age, ability and education. For 




, . However, in what follows I 
suppress the (q,s) superscripts where there is no risk of confusion.  
It is convenient to solve the household problem in two parts: First, the household chooses 
education and training so as to maximize the present value of earnings. Then it chooses 
consumption subject to a present value budget constraint. 
3.1.1  Earnings Maximization 
At the beginning of active life, at age a0, the household is endowed with an ability level q and 
draws schooling cost parameters ps from a distribution described below. Next, the household 
chooses between ns discrete schooling levels corresponding to different values of as, ps, and 
flow tuition costs ds. As a result of choosing education level s a worker with ability q begins 
work life with a human capital endowment of Hq,s. Then, at ages as+1 through aR, the  7 
household chooses job training investments in the form of time (v) and purchased goods (x). 
The objective is to maximize the present value of earnings net of taxes and education costs 
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where the present value of earnings is given by 
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Here, 
s
a b 1 - + w  is the pre-tax wage rate per efficiency unit of labor of type s at date b+a-1 
(when the household born at b is age a). The household earns w h, but spends w v h on training 
time and x on training goods. In addition, the amount Tw is spent on labor income taxes. The 
labor tax function depends on pre-tax earnings and is assumed to be differentiable. Slightly 
abusing notation, I write  ) ) 1 ( ( ) , ( , , , 1 a b a b a b
s
a b w w x h v T a b T - - w = - + . The cumulative discount 
factors are  
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where R is the gross rate of return on capital after taxes. Note that E is computed from pre-tax 
prices because total tax payments cannot be computed from marginal tax rates. However, the 
discount factor uses the after-tax interest rate. During work life human capital evolves 
according to  
 ) , , , ( ) 1 ( , , , , 1 , s v x h G h h a b a b a b a b h a b + d - = +  
with initial condition  s q a b H h
S , 1 , = + . Here, dh is the depreciation rate of human capital and G is 
the production function for job training which varies by education level. 
3.1.2 Consumption  Choice 
Given optimal levels of schooling and job-training, the household chooses a consumption path 
that maximizes the discounted sum of utilities 
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where b > 0 is a discount factor. Consumption begins at age aC. The household starts with 
asset holdings of  0
0 , = a b k . The flow budget constraint is  8 
(1)   a b
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with terminal condition  0 1 , = + L a b k . z is a lump-sum transfer. Optimal consumption is 
governed by a standard Euler equation. 
(2)   ) ( ) ( 1 , , + + ¢ b = ¢ a b a b a b c u R c u  
A solution of the household problem consists of age profiles for {c, k, h, x, v} and a scalar s 
that satisfy (i) the conditions for optimal job training; (ii) the consumption Euler equation (2) 
and (iii) the budget constraint (1); (iv) the law of motion for h; (v) the choice of s maximizes 
the present value of earnings. 
3.2  Intergenerational Transmission of Ability 
Up to this point the specification of the household sector has been conventional (see especially 
HLT). The novel feature is the modeling of the intergenerational transmission of human 
capital. The main difficulty here is the paucity of data measuring parental (or other) inputs in 
children’s human capital accumulation. As a consequence, even the nature of the transmission 
mechanism is uncertain. Human capital may be transmitted through genetic (or otherwise 
exogenous) inheritance, via parental investment, or through peer spillovers, such as learning by 
watching. The literature has mainly pursued the first two of these channels.
4 
The first approach was pioneered by BT who posit a Galton-style regression to the mean 
equation for the intergenerational transmission of abilities (Q) of the form 
(3)   e + a + = ) ln( ) ln( P Q q Q , 
where the superscript P indicates parental variables, q  and a are parameters, and e is an i.i.d. 
disturbance. This setup may be labeled “pure nature” because it most appropriately describes a 
genetic transfer of abilities, which is independent of parental behavior. In this model 
intergenerational persistence has two sources: the exogenous inheritance of ability and the 
dependence of human capital investment on parental characteristics. As shown by BT, for 
parents who are not borrowing constrained only the first channel generates persistence as 
unconstrained parents choose the level of human capital investment that maximizes child 
earnings, regardless of parental characteristics.  
                                                 
4 The peer spillover approach plays a role in models of local education finance such as Fernandez and 
Rogerson (1997).  9 
The benefit of this approach is that it can be quantified without measuring parental investment 
in child ability. Since the transfer of ability is exogenous, it is admissible to estimate a reduced 
form equation of the form (3) and impose it as a primitive on the model. However, the 
approach needs to be extended in order to be consistent with a number of empirical 
observations, especially with the notion that parental behavior affects child outcomes.
5 In the 
data presented above this is reflected in the fact that parental education choice affects child 
outcomes, even after controlling for parental and child ability. 
The literature has addressed this issue in two ways. A number of authors have suggested 
alternatives to BT’s framework in which child human capital is solely determined by parental 
investment. Intergenerational persistence is then generated by assumptions about the human 
capital production technology or about parental preferences which guarantee that richer 
parents invest more in their children (e.g., Ehrlich and Lui 1990). However, given the paucity 
of data, such models are difficult to quantify (see the discussion in Aiyagari et al. 2000).   
Recent quantitative studies have therefore returned to versions of BT’s original framework. 
Restuccia and Urrutia (1999) posit a special case of BT in which ability is uncorrelated across 
cohorts. Intergenerational persistence is then entirely due to borrowing constraints. A similar 
approach is pursued by Knowles (1999), but in his model intergenerational persistence also 
arises because poor parents have more children and invest less in their human capital. A key 
difficulty with both models is that they generate too little persistence for high income (or high 
wealth) parents who invest the earnings maximizing amount in child human capital.  
The present model is also based on BT, but extends it in different directions as suggested by 
the empirical findings of section 2. In particular, it is important to capture the notion that 
parental behavior affects child outcomes. In my data, parental education affects child ability, 
controlling for parental ability. This is captured by assuming that parental human capital (both 
endowed and acquired) stochastically determines child ability. In addition, parental education 
affects child education, controlling for parental and child ability. This observation is captured 
by assuming that the schooling cost ps is stochastically transmitted from parents to children.  
Formally, I assume that the ability parameter of a child with a parent who has human capital h
P 
at the time the child is born is governed by a Galton equation analogous to (3), 
(4)   e + a + = ) ln( ) ( ) ˆ ln(
P P h s q Q , 
                                                 
5 It seems uncontroversial that both nature and nurture affect child outcomes, even if some evidence 
suggests that a substantial fraction of intergenerational persistence may be genetic; see Behrman and 
Taubman (1989).  10 
where  e is an i.i.d. disturbance term with distribution N(0, se) and q  may be normalized to 
zero. Parental abilities and schooling determine h
P and are therefore transmitted to the children. 
Permitting the transmission parameter a to depend on parental schooling as well allows the 
model to replicate the empirical transition probabilities slightly better, but is not important for 
the quantitative results (in the calibrated model a(1) and a(ns) differ by less than 7%). 
For computational purposes, the continuously distributed Q ˆ  is rounded to a finite grid of 
ability levels, Qq, q = 1, …, nq. In particular, the child’s q is given by the lowest grid point 
below  Q ˆ :   } ˆ | ˆ { max ˆ Q Q q q q £ = . For a given parent, the probability that the child has 
) ln( ) ˆ ln( q Q Q <  is  
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where  F is the normal cdf with standard deviation se. Define Q(0|.,.) = 0. The transition 
probabilities are then 
(5)   ) , | 1 ( ) , | ( ) , | Pr(
P P P P P P s q q s q q s q q - Q - Q =  
One benefit of this specification is to remain close to the structure introduced by BT, which is 
arguably the leading theory of intergenerational mobility, while at the same time being 
consistent with the stylized facts pointed out in section 2. The model abstracts from a number 
of features that have been suggested in the literature. Allowing for parental investment in child 
human capital would not change any results as long as parents invest the earnings maximizing 
amount (see BT). Borrowing constraints could invalidate this result, but Cameron and 
Heckman (1998) suggest that these are not empirically important. Allowing for parental 
fertility choice, as suggested by Knowles (1999), might be important, especially for the poorest 
households. Clearly, alternative models could be equally consistent with the data and should be 
explored in future research. 
The present model may be thought of as the “pure nurture” counterpart to BT’s “pure nature” 
model in that all skill components (ability, education, training) are affected by individual 
behavior. There is no room for genetically transmitted (or otherwise exogenous) endowments. 
In the data, it is likely that both genetic (“nature”) and acquired (“nurture”) abilities are 
transmitted, although their relative importance is controversial. A possible concern is therefore 
that a pure nurture model may overstate the responsiveness of intergenerational mobility to 
policy changes. However, this only strengthens the main finding that the policies studied here 
have very little effect on intergenerational persistence.  11 
3.3 Firms 
Firms produce output according to the constant returns to scale production function 
) , , , ( 1 S n
t t t t L L K F Y ￿ = , where K is capital input and L
s denotes labor input of schooling level s. 
Firms rent all inputs from households and maximize period profits. The first order conditions 
are standard:  ) (t F r K t = ,   ) (t F S L
s
t = w . 
3.4 Government 
The government imposes capital and labor income taxes on households. Each household 
receives a lump-sum transfer equal to its own tax payments. The government therefore collects 
zero net revenues from each individual, which ensures that the tax reform has no direct 
redistributional effects. A more conventional specification would redistribute tax revenues in 
equal lump-sum payments to all households. This would make it harder to interpret the results 
because it distributes wealth across old and young cohorts, which distorts savings decisions. 
The capital tax rate is exogenous, tK. The labor tax rate is determined by the tax function Tw 
which is piecewise linear in earnings. 
3.5 Equilibrium 
There are nq · ns household classes. Within each class, all households behave identically. Let 
) , ( Pr s q b  be the mass of households with ability q and schooling s in cohort b. A competitive 
equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices  ) , , ( t
s
t t R r w , a sequence of aggregate quantities  
) , , ( s
t t t L K Y , a distribution of household types  ) , ( Pr s q b , transition matrices  ) , | , ( Pr P P
b s q s q , 
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These satisfy the following conditions. (i) Factor prices ( s
t t r w , ) are consistent with the firm’s 
first-order condition. (ii) The after tax rate of return is  ) ( ) 1 ( 1 , k t t K t r R d - t - + = . (iii) 
Household age profiles solve the household problem, where transfers rebate all tax payments:   
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(iv) The distribution of types is consistent with the household’s optimal education choice of 
Prb(s | q, s
P) and with (5). (v) Goods markets clear:  t k t t t t K K X C Y ) 1 ( 1 d - - + + = + , where Ct 
denotes aggregate consumption and Xt is aggregate job-training investment. (vi) Factor 
markets clear: 
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In what follows, the analysis is restricted to steady states, in which all variables are constant 
over time. 
4. Parameter Choices 
The model parameters, summarized in table 4, are chosen based on aggregate U.S. 
observations and on the intergenerational mobility facts documented in section 2. More detail 
is provided in the appendix. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.1 Households 
Agents die at age aL = 75 and retire at age aR = 64. Schooling begins at age a0 = 7 (based on 
enrollment data in Cohn and Geske 1990, table 1.2). Children are born when parents are aged 
aB = 30. Consumption begins at age aC = 16. The utility function is assumed to be of the form 
uc c () / ( ) =-
- 1 1
s s  with a conventional value of s = 2. b is chosen to match a capital-output 
ratio of 2.5. 
Schooling.  The parameters to be chosen for each schooling level are: as, d
s, Hq,s, and the 
parameters that govern the distribution of schooling costs. There are ns = 2 schooling levels 
corresponding to high school completion (aS = a0 + 11) and college graduation (as = a0 + 15). 
The amounts of human capital produced by each schooling level, Hq,s, are chosen to replicate 
observed relative earnings levels (Eq,s). If labor of different types are perfect substitutes, then 
H1,1 is normalized to one, while the other H1,s are then chosen to replicate earnings relative to 
E1,1. Otherwise, H1,s is normalized to 1 for all s and the relative earnings of various s types are 
governed by parameters of the production function.  
The schooling cost parameter ps is normalized to zero for the lowest schooling level and drawn 
from a normal distribution with mean m(q, s
P) and standard deviation s(q) for s = 2. The 
dependence of m on parental schooling creates intergenerational persistence in schooling. For 
parsimony, mean college costs are assumed to be of the form 
() ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( P P s q abs q s q n × m + m = m . The m(q) are chosen to replicate the fraction of college 
graduates in each earnings class in the data,  ) | Pr( q s . I normalize n(1) = 0 and choose n(2) < 0 
to replicate the difference in college attendance between children of parents who are college 
graduates as opposed to high school graduates,  ) 1 | 2 ( ) 2 | 2 ( = = - = = P P s s P s s P . The 
standard deviation of ps is to match estimates of the responsiveness of college enrollment to  13 
tuition changes (Kane 1994). Based on Cohn and Geske (1990) the tuition cost of college is 
set to 0.5% of aggregate output. 
Job Training.  As is conventional in this literature, the production function for human capital is 
assumed to be of the form 
y j = x h v h B G s q s ) ( , . The parameters to be chosen are then Bs, 
j, y, and dh. Following HLT dh is set to 0. There is a range of parameter estimates in the 
literature for j and y. An intermediate value for returns to scale is  75 . 0 = y + j . At least half 
of the total cost of job training is due to time inputs, which suggests j = 0.45 and y = 0.3. 
Learning productivity is chosen so as to replicate earnings growth between the ages of 25 and 
48 as implied by the estimated earnings equations described above. 
Intergenerational Mobility.  The grid points (Qq) are chosen to match the desired Pr(q). The 
transmission coefficients in the Galton equation [a(s
P)] are chosen to replicate the stationary 
transition probability that high ability parents have high ability children, Pr(q > 2 | q
P > 2, s
P). 
The variance of e is normalized to one. This is possible because changing se, a(s
P), and ln(Qq) 
by a common factor leaves the equilibrium unchanged. 
4.2 Firms 
The production function is of the form 
q - q = 1 L K F  where L is a labor aggregator. The 
parameter  q is set to 0.3 so as to match the U.S. capital income share.  The depreciation rate dK 
is chosen to replicate a capital output ratio of 2.5 and an investment share in GDP of 
2 . 0 / = Y I . In steady state  I K K K + d - = ) 1 ( . Therefore,  08 . 0 ) / ( ) / ( = = d K Y Y IK K . In the 
baseline case, L is a CES aggregator of labor of different schooling levels: 
  ()




1 ) ( ) ( L L L  
with u1 + u2 = 1. The elasticity of substitution between high school and college labor is taken 
from HLT:  441 . 1 ) 1 /( 1 = r - . The weights us are set to match the average ratio of college to 
high school present value of earnings. I also explore the case where the different types of labor 
are perfect substitutes: 
2 1 L L L + = . The parameters us and r are then dropped. 
4.3 Tax  Rates 
Following HLT, the capital tax rate is set to 0.15. Define net earnings as  * ˆ y y y - =  where y* 
is a deductible. For flat taxes the tax function is simply  y y T w w ˆ ) ˆ ( t = . With progressive taxes, 
the wage tax combines a deductible with the requirement that the marginal tax rate is 
continuous. For progressive taxes the marginal wage tax function is  14 
{} } ˆ , { min , 0 max ) ˆ ( 2 1 max y y Tw t + t t = ¢ . The top marginal tax rate is set to 0.36 (see the 
appendix for details). 
5. Simulation Results 
This section presents numerical simulation results that shed light on how redistributive policies 
affect intergenerational earnings mobility. The experiments compare steady states under 
alternative policy regimes. The first experiment studies the effects of subsidizing tuition 
expenditures; the second examines the move from flat to progressive labor income taxation. 
The main finding in both cases is that the changes in intergenerational mobility are minimal. 
5.1 Tuition  Subsidies 
The first experiment is meant to capture the effects of policies that reduce the private costs of 
education, such as public provision of education, tax exemptions on savings earmarked for 
educational expenditures, among others. The experiment compares the steady state effects of a 
50% subsidy to tuition payments financed by lump-sum taxation.  
Findings.  The steady state changes in aggregates are shown in table 5. The tuition subsidy 
increases college attendance for all but the most able households. As a consequence, college 
labor input and aggregate output increase and the college wage premium declines. The ability 
composition of the college population deteriorates, so that the college earnings premium drops. 
A striking finding is that the tuition subsidy exacerbates earnings inequality: the quintile ratio of 
lifetime earnings rises by 19.2%. Table 6 shows how the transition matrix for earnings quartiles 
is modified by the tuition subsidy. The changes are generally minimal, no more than 0.5% in 
any cell. Consistent with this finding, the Galton coefficient for earnings is nearly unaffected.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Table 7 shows transition probabilities for education. The probability of placing a child in 
college, Pr(s = 2 | s
P), increases by 4.6% for the parents with high school degrees and for 3.9% 
for college educated parents. This represents a slight increase in educational mobility. 
However, the change is so small that the Galton coefficient for education falls by only 0.01. 
The main finding is therefore: Policies that reduce the private cost of education have very little 
impact on intergenerational mobility. In addition, earnings inequality is not diminished but 
exacerbated. This finding casts doubt on the common presumption that public education  15 
finance is an effective tool for achieving “equality of opportunity” for the children of poor 
parents. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Discussion.  The next task is to develop intuition for the two main findings: (i) Earnings 
inequality increases despite the fact that the policy succeeds in raising college attendance of the 
children of the poor; (ii) the transition matrix for earnings is nearly unchanged in spite of large 
changes in school attendance. 
First, why does earnings inequality increase? The reason can be seen from table 1: attending 
college reduces earnings for low ability households. In this sense, the tuition subsidy induces 
such households to over invest in education. This result may appear surprising or even 
implausible at first (although HLT obtain a similar finding from a panel of NLSY households). 
But note that this does not mean that attending college reduces peak earnings. It only means 
that the increase of peak earnings is not sufficient to compensate the household for losing the 
first 4 years of working life. Also note that low ability households may still enjoy higher 
welfare due to the non-pecuniary benefits of attending college. The policy may thus succeed in 
reducing alternative measures of inequality, even though earnings inequality increases. 
To understand the second result, note that individual earnings are largely determined by ability 
and much less by education (recall table 1). As a consequence, the changes in the transition 
matrix for abilities mirror those for earnings very closely. The task is therefore to understand 
why the transition matrix for abilities, Pr(q | q
P), is nearly unaffected by the policy change. 
Consider the following decomposition: 
(6)   å = P s
P P P P P q s s q q q q ) | Pr( ) , | Pr( ) | Pr( . 
The interpretation of (6) is that two factors affect the ability distribution of children for a 
parent with ability q
P. The first factor is parental schooling choice, Pr(s
P | q
P), which affects the 
parent’s human capital endowment at the beginning of work life. The second factor is parental 
job training, which augments the amount of adult human capital that is transmitted to the child 
(h
P) and thereby changes Pr(q | q
P, s
P).  
Note first that job training, and thus Pr(q | q
P, s
P), is nearly unaffected by the policy change. 
Since all inputs to job training are paid for through reduced earnings, changes in wage rates 
have little direct impact on training investment for households with given (q
P, s
P). The changes 
in Pr(q | q
P) are therefore mostly driven by changes in parental school attendance, Pr(s
P | q
P). 
But these are simply not large enough to generate significant changes in child outcomes. To  16 
make this statement precise, note that with constant Pr(q | q
P, s
P) the changes in transition 
probabilities are given by 
(7) 
)] 1 , | Pr( ) 2 , | [Pr( ) | 2 Pr(
) | 1 Pr( ) 1 , | Pr( ) | 2 Pr( ) 2 , | Pr( ) | Pr(
= - = = D =
= D = + = D = = D
P P P P P P
P P P P P P P P P
s q q s q q q s
q s s q q q s s q q q q
 
where DPr(.) denotes the change in a transition probability between the progressive and the flat 
tax steady state. The second equation uses the fact that  ) | 2 Pr( ) | 1 Pr(
P P P P q s q s = D - = = D . 
In words: Only parents that alter their education choice contribute to changes in the transition 
matrix Pr(q | q
P). A parent who switches from high school to college attendance increases the 
probability that its child has ability q by the term in square brackets. 
To see why the changes in (7) are small, it is instructive to work through an example. Consider 
a median ability parent (q
P = 2). For such a parent, the probability of attending college rises 
substantially, by  = = D ) | 2 Pr(
P P q s  0.063, but the probability of having a child with q = 4 
rises by only 0.005. Where does this figure come from? Attending college raises parental 
human capital (h
P) by 1 (from 1.9 to 2.9). The associated increase in the probability of having a 
highly able child can be approximated by a simple calculation. Human capital of the most able 
parents exceeds that of the least able parents by about 6. This gap is associated with a 
difference in Pr(q = 4 | q
P) of about 0.33. Taking a linear approximation, increasing h
P by 1 
raises Pr(q = 4 | q
P) by about 0.33 / 6 = 0.055. If a parent with q
P = 2 switches from high 
school to college attainment, the probability of having a child with q = 4 should therefore rise 
by approximately  
(8)   » = = - = = ) 1 , | 4 Pr( ) 2 , | 4 Pr(
P P P P s q q s q q  0.055,  
which is not too far from the figure generated by the model (0.078).
6 While this is a significant 
change (it means that the fraction with highly able children rises by more than one third for 
those who change schooling), it still implies an increase in the fraction of children with high 
ability of only  
  DPr(q = 4 | q
P = 2) » 0.063 ·  0.078 = 0.005, 
                                                 
6 It is tempting to argue that h
P changes by almost 50%, which should be associated with a larger 
change in child abilities. However, it is not the percentage change in h
P that determines the change in the 
probability of having a highly able child. What matters is the absolute change in h
P relative to the 
difference in h
P between high and low ability parents.  17 
which is very close to the actual value generated by the model (also 0.005). The reason is that 
only a fraction of ability 2 parents do change their schooling choice and it is the product of the 
this fraction with the change from (8) that matters for the ability transition matrix. 
Similar arguments could be made to establish that the changes in ability persistence are small 
for parents of other types as well. For parents with lowest ability (q
P = 1) the change in school 
attainment is very large, but education has virtually no effect on h
P. For high ability parents h
P 
changes by more due to education, but the fraction of parents altering their education choice is 
small. These calculations suggests that policies which affect only education but not other adult 
human capital investments (the first term in (6)) are unlikely to have large effects on 
intergenerational earnings mobility. 
To summarize, subsidizing education does achieve its intermediate objective of inducing more 
low ability households to invest in education. But it fails to accomplish its ultimate objectives: 
to enhance intergenerational mobility or the earnings of the poor and to reduce lifetime 
earnings inequality. It is shown next that alternative policies, which raise the relative rewards 
of human capital investments for the poor, are similarly unsuccessful. 
5.2  Progressive Income Taxation 
This section examines to what extent redistributional tax policies succeed in enhancing 
intergenerational earnings mobility. The experiment again compares two steady states. The 
progressive tax steady state is parameterized so as to replicate U.S. data including the 
progressive income tax system. The flat tax steady state is obtained by replacing the 
progressive labor income tax by a flat tax. The capital income tax is held constant at tK = 0.15, 
while the flat wage tax rate tw is chosen to maintain government revenues unchanged. Results 
are reported for the move from the flat rate to the progressive tax system. This addresses the 
question to what extent existing progressive taxation affects mobility and inequality compared 
with a hypothetical steady state with flat taxes.
7 
Findings. As in the tuition subsidy experiment, the changes in intergenerational mobility are 
very small. Table 8 shows that the transition matrix for earnings is nearly unaffected by the tax 
change, especially for the poor. The main effect of progressive taxation is to reduce the 
earnings prospects of the children of high ability parents. Overall inequality as measured by the 
quintile ratio for lifetime earnings falls by 9.4% (table 5). The persistence of education is 
                                                 
7 This experiment is the reverse of the one studied in HLT who consider the move from a progressive to 
a flat tax.   18 
virtually unchanged (table 7). As in the previous section, the main finding is that 
redistributional policies have only a minimal effect on intergenerational mobility.  
[INSERT Table 8 HERE] 
Discussion. The intuition for this finding is similar to that provided for the tuition subsidy. 
Recall that the transition matrix for abilities is determined by parental education choice, Pr(s
P | 
q
P), and by the transition matrix Pr(q | q
P, s
P). The latter is determined entirely by parental 
human capital, h
P. Since job-training inputs are tax-deductible, optimal training investment 
changes little for most households. The exception are the most able households, for who 
progressive taxation implies the largest tax increase. Therefore, h
P and the distribution of child 
abilities remain largely unchanged for parents of given types (q
P, s
P).  
The changes in intergenerational mobility are therefore mostly due to changes in parental 
schooling decisions. College attendance falls by 0.1 for the most able parents, but rises by 
around 0.08 for all others (table 5). The reason is that the progressive tax reduces the college 
premium strongly for highly able households. As these reduce college attendance, the college 
wage rate w
2 rises. This induces households with lower abilities to increase college attendance. 
The argument why this does not translate into larger changes of child abilities exactly parallels 
the tuition subsidy case: given that the tax reform has little impact on job training, significantly 
altering the transition matrix for abilities (and thus for earnings) would require very large 
changes in schooling choice. 
5.3 Sensitivity  Analysis 
This section examines the robustness of the previous findings. Since intergenerational 
persistence is not precisely estimated, an important question is how the findings change over 
the plausible range of persistence measures. Estimates of the Galton coefficient for earnings 
range from 0.2 to 0.6 (Mulligan 1997, table 7.5). Parameterizing the model to replicate any 
value in this range has little impact on the predicted changes in earnings persistence and 
inequality. For the tuition subsidy experiment the Galton coefficient drops by less than 2% and 
the quintile rises by at most 21% in all cases (compared with baseline changes of 0% and 
19.2%). For the move to the progressive tax system the maximum changes are 5.3% and 
10.9%. These findings suggest that sensible increases in intergenerational persistence do not 
overturn the main finding that redistributive policies of the kind studied here have little impact 
on intergenerational mobility.   19 
Experimentation with variations of other parameters, such as the substitution elasticity between 
labor types or the age at which human capital is transmitted from parents to children, did not 
yield significant changes in any of the results and are therefore not reported. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines to what extent redistributive policies succeed in promoting 
intergenerational earnings mobility. The question is studied in the context of a quantitative life-
cycle model with human capital that can account for selected features of U.S. data on 
intergenerational mobility and lifetime earnings inequality. Two types of policies are 
considered, both aimed at increasing the returns to human capital accumulation for the children 
of poor parents. The first type of policy reduces the private cost of education, the second type 
raises the reward of human capital investments by lowering labor income taxes. 
The main finding is that such policies have little impact on intergenerational mobility. 
Moreover, policies that reduce the private costs of education fail to reduce lifetime earnings 
inequality. These results are shown to be robust against variations in model parameters, 
especially the degree of intergenerational persistence. I conclude that public policies of the kind 
studied here may be largely ineffective in promoting equality of opportunity. 
Future research should examine the robustness of these findings to a number of model 
extensions, such as parental fertility choice (Knowles 1999) or alternative ways of modeling 
the transfer of human capital.   20 
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8. Tables 
Table 1.  Distribution of lifetime earnings   
  q = 1  q = 2  q = 3  q = 4 
Present value of 
earnings (Eq,s) 
    
    s  =  1  234,752 421,667 582,668 778,706 
    s  =  2  149,501 411,993 601,300 903,702 
College premium  -36.3  -2.3  3.2  16.1 
Fraction with 
college  9.4 15.4 23.4 41.7 
Notes: The present value of earnings is measured in 1992 dollars. The college premium is defined  
as (average earnings of all college graduates) / (average earnings of all others).  
 
Table 2.  Probability that a child attends college   
  q = 1  q = 2  q = 3  q = 4 
s
P = 1  6.6  11.0  15.8  25.2 
s
P = 2  24.8  54.7  52.6  68.9 
Notes: The table shows 100 ·  Pr(s = 2 | q, s
P). 
 
Table 3.  Transition probabilities for child ability   
   q = 1  q = 2  q = 3  q = 4 
q
P = 1  s
P = 1  45.5  28.0  17.9  8.6 
  s
P = 2  26.5  27.9  25.7  19.9 
q
P = 4  s
P = 1  17.5  24.6  28.2  29.6 
  s
P = 2  10.4  19.5  28.1  41.9 
Notes: The table shows 100 ·  Pr(q | q
P, s
P).  23 
Table 4.  Baseline parameters  
Households   Education 
aR = 64 
 
ac = 16  
aB = 30 
aL = 75 







Start of consumption 
Age of child birth 
Age of death 
 
Matches K/Y = 2.5 
Matches Pr(q) 
Matches  
Pr(q > 2 | q
P > 2, s
P) 
  a0 = 7 








School enrollment data 
 
Matches estimated Eq,s 
Matches Pr(s | q) 
Matches sensitivity of 
college enrollment to 
tuition changes 
Matches aggregate 
tuition spending of 
0.7% of Y 
Firms   Job  Training 
q = 0.3 
dK = 0.08 
u1 
 
441 . 1 ) 1 /( 1 = r -  
Capital share in GNP 
Matches I/Y = 0.2 
Matches ratio of college 
to high school earnings 
HLT 
  Bs 
 
 
j = 0.45  
y = 0.3 
dh = 0 
Matches earnings 
growth between ages 
25 and 48 
Heckman (1976), Haley 
(1976) 
HLT 
  24 
Table 5. Changes in aggregates   
 Education 
subsidy 
Move to progressive 
wage taxation 
Output -0.8  -1.6 
Capital stock  -0.5  1.0 
Labor input  -1.0  -2.7 
High school labor input  (L
1)  -3.2 -0.7 
College labor input  (L
2) 3.8  -6.9 
High school wage rate  (w
1) 1.7  -0.3 
College wage rate  (w
2)  -3.1 4.3 
Fraction with college degree  7.8  3.1 
    q = 1  27.6  6.2 
    q = 2  6.3  9.3 
    q = 3  1.5  8.0 
    q = 4  -4.3  -10.8 
Fraction among college educated 
    with q = 1  19.9  6.3 
    with q = 4  -15.3  -22.0 
Pr(q = 4)  0.1  -0.3 
College premium  -40.4  -18.0 
Quintile ratio  19.2  -9.4 
Galton coefficient for earnings  0.00  -0.02 
Galton coefficient for education  -0.01  0.00 
Notes: Changes of fractions in percentage points. Other changes in percent.   25 
 





1 2 3 4 
1  0.0 -0.1 -0.2  0.3 
2  -0.5  -0.2 0.3 0.4 
3  -0.1 0.1 0.1  -0.1 
4  0.0 0.2 0.1  -0.4 
Notes: The table shows steady state changes. The figures are percentage changes. 
 
Table 7.  Transition probabilities for education   
 Levels    Changes  [%] 




Pr(s = 2 | s
P = 1)  13.7  12.7   4.6 1.7 
Pr(s = 2 | s
P = 2)  57.2  56.2   3.9 2.0 
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1 2 3 4 
1  0.0 0.1 0.2  -0.3 
2  -1.0 -0.3  0.2  1.2 
3  -0.6 -0.4  0.1  0.9 
4  1.2 1.2 0.4  -2.8 
Notes: The table shows steady state changes due to moving to progressive wage taxation. The figures are 
percentage changes. 
   A-1 
Appendix: Parameter Choices 
Households.  The standard deviation of ps is chosen to match Kane’s (1994) estimates of the 
responsiveness of college enrollment to tuition changes. He finds that a $1,000 increase in 
tuition reduces enrollment by 4.6% for the lowest family income class, but by only 1.2% for 
the highest. The average change across all households is 3.2%. The s(q) are chosen to 
replicate the 4.6% figure for the lowest ability class and an average response of 3.2%. 
Translating $1000 into model units requires to express it as a fraction of average per capita 
earnings. In 1990 median weekly earnings of one-earner households are $455, so that $1000 
represent approximately 4% of annual median earnings (Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 1993, table 672). 
Tuition. The tuition variable represents the annual direct cost of attending college. This should 
include all privately paid costs, except forgone earnings. There is no tuition for high school, 
reflecting the fact that 90% of the direct cost of high school education is paid for by the public 
sector (Cohn and Geske 1990). In 1990, tuition and fees for colleges and other higher 
education amounted to $37.4 billion or 0.67% of GDP. Since the model understates the size of 
the college population (all who enroll finish within four years) and since the tuition subsidy 
should only affect the part of education costs that represents tuition payments, the ratio of 
aggregate college tuition to output is set to 0.5%.  































































t + t = ¢ . 
Given the choice of range boundaries below, this simplifies to 
  {} } ˆ , { min , 0 max ) ˆ ( 2 1 max y y Tw t + t t = ¢  
The range boundaries are defined such that the average tax schedule is continuous: 
0
2
0 2 0 1 5 . 0 T = t + t y y  and  
2
1 2 1 1 1 max 3 5 . 0 y y y t + t = t + T . The slope coefficients are defined 
so that the marginal tax schedule is continuous:   0 0 2 1 = t + t y   and   max 1 2 1 t = t + t y . In  A-2 
addition, I require a marginal tax rate at zero net earnings of t1. The income level at which 
maximum taxes are reached is specified exogenously (y1). 
Based on Internal Revenue Service data for 1998, t1 and t2 are chosen to match marginal tax 
rates of 0.15 at y = y* and the maximum marginal tax rate of tmax = 0.36 at y1 = $70,000. This 
neglects the fact that in the U.S. tax code an additional tax bracket exists. It has a marginal tax 
rate of 39.6% for AGI’s over $278,000. The model does not have households with earnings 
that high. The deductible is y* = $9,660 (see HLT). Average earnings per adult are set to 
$30,000.  